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BUSTING UP THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY
Andrew S. Pollis*
INTRODUCTION
It is by now axiomatic that the objective of the civil lawsuit has evolved.
Litigants no longer routinely take their disputes to trial.1 Some claim that a
culture of settlement has supplanted the culture of trial resolution.2 As one
scholar notes, “The focus on conciliation and consensus is so dominant that,
stunningly, going to trial is seen as pathological—as a ‘failure’ of the
system.”3
But the vanishing trial does not necessarily leave settlement as the
singular focus of civil litigation. What has supplanted the trial culture is not
settlement alone but rather a culture of pretrial practice.4 Twenty-firstcentury litigation has come to revolve around the two hallmarks of pretrial
practice: protracted discovery and dispositive motions. Unquestionably,
settlement is one of the driving objectives; adversaries seek to make
litigation as painful and expensive as possible for each other so that
settlement becomes the better option. Yet there is a second, omnipresent
objective: maximization of fees for lawyers who charge their clients by the
hour.5 One law firm’s fee-driven approach was recently exposed in
* Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Many thanks to Fordham
University School of Law and Bruce Green for the invitation to contribute to this important
colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials and to the other
participants for their engaging scholarship and insightful comments, particularly Howard
Erichson. For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond
the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration
Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017).
1. See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 2 (2016) (“The jury has
essentially vanished.”); see also infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
2. See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All over Again?: Pretrial as Trial in Complex
Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 647 (2011) (“Settlement rather than trial has emerged as
the dominant endgame of civil litigation, especially litigation complex in substance or
procedural format.”); Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender: Summary Jury
Trial as a Means to Overcome Iqbal’s Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication,
Negotiation and Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1149, 1150 n.1
(2010) (collecting authorities); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1075 (1984) (critiquing settlement as inconsonant with justice).
3. Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65
EMORY L.J. 1491, 1511 (2016).
4. See id. at 1512 (“Part and parcel of the vanishing trial is a focus on pretrial
practice.”).
5. See Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 246
(1996) (“Attorneys who work on an hourly fee basis have an incentive to defer settlement
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litigation where discovery uncovered a partner gleefully celebrating the size
of a bill and encouraging his colleagues to “[c]hurn that bill, baby!”6 It is
the worst-kept secret in the legal profession.
These twin objectives—extracting settlement and maximizing billable
hours—have fostered a subculture of litigation that can obscure the goal of
“ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”7 Particularly in
high-stakes litigation, the pretrial phase of a lawsuit has become “a stage
unto itself, no longer a prelude to trial but rather assumed to be the way to
end a case without trial”8—in short, a pretrial industry. Moreover, its
emergence raises important questions about the ethical obligations of
lawyers to avoid improperly exploiting the powerful tools afforded by the
judicial system for their clients’ or their own personal gain.9
The judicial system does a poor job of responding. Judges are typically
eager to move cases from their dockets by encouraging parties to settle.10
They can also be slow and reluctant to rule on civil motions, particularly
discovery motions.11 As a consequence, courts often turn a blind eye to
abuses, so parties often have the unbridled ability to pursue or to obstruct
discovery, regardless of the merits of their positions.12 To make matters
worse, the judicial system has reacted to the pretrial industry by erecting
barriers that purport to address the problem but that actually impose
disproportionate burdens on the parties least able to bear them.13 Through
and to continue working on the case as long as their return per hour of work on the case
exceeds their opportunity cost of time. Thus, hourly fee attorneys may sometimes
recommend against settlement early in the litigation even when settlement would be in the
client’s best interest.”).
6. Andrew Strickler, DLA Piper Emails a Wake-Up Call on Bill Padding, LAW360
(Mar. 26, 2013, 9:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/427386/dla-piper-emails-awake-up-call-on-bill-padding?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc/R5KH-KQS8].
7. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
8. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000).
9. To be sure, some commentators have offered a more charitable view. John H.
Langbein ascribes the demise of the civil trial to the “better mousetrap” reflected in the civil
rules: “a civil procedure centered in pretrial discovery. Litigants no longer go to trial
because they no longer need to.” John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the
United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 569 (2012).
10. See Freer, supra note 3, at 1508.
11. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text; see also James G. Carr, From the
Bench: Fixing Discovery: The Judge’s Job, LITIGATION, Summer–Fall 2012, at 8
(“[A]djudication of discovery motions takes time. The busier the court, the less time it has
for such ancillary disputes.”); John Burritt McArthur, The Strange Case of American Civil
Procedure and the Missing Uniform Discovery Time Limits, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 865, 883
n.51 (1996) (“[J]udges can get bogged down in trial and trial delays gradually back up the
judicial time necessary to handle discovery matters.”).
12. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform,
27 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1992) (noting the “injustices of unbridled discovery”); Ettie Ward, The
After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
893, 914 (2008) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern about “unbridled large-case
discovery and the perceived inability of trial judges to control it”).
13. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 286, 304 (2013) (stating that the Supreme Court’s support of litigation reforms “seems
to have placed a thumb on the justice scale favoring corporate and government defendants”).
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higher pleading standards, tighter discovery rules, and greater reliance on
summary judgment, judges have made it virtually impossible for parties
with legitimate grievances but limited resources to have their day in court,
especially against wealthier adversaries.14 As Arthur Miller explained,
“[T]he federal courts have erected a sequence of procedural stop signs
during the past twenty-five years that has transformed the relatively
uncluttered pretrial process envisioned by the original drafters of the
Federal Rules into a morass of litigation friction points.”15
While some argue that “[r]eturning to a trial model would be a significant
step toward fulfilling the traditional expectations for the federal courts,”16
that step backward is unlikely to occur. But I agree that fixes are in order,
and I offer two. First, we should consider requiring at least some parties to
engage in early settlement evaluation—ideally before extensive discovery
gets underway—by submitting cases to summary jury trials and imposing
consequences on parties who choose to disregard the results. Second, we
should allocate a greater percentage of judicial resources to discovery
management through the routine appointment of special masters to curtail
the discovery free-for-all. Neither fix is without its costs, but the costs are
likely much lower than the costs of perpetuating the pretrial industry that
currently drives civil litigation in the United States.
I. INCENTIVES THAT PROMOTE THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY
Oft-quoted statistics, relying heavily on Professor Marc Galanter’s
research,17 reinforce the now-familiar truism that most civil cases do not
end in trial. Absolute numbers of trials have dropped in the last several
decades, even as civil filings have increased dramatically.18 The percentage
of civil cases ending in trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to only 1.8
percent in 2002.19 Certainly some of the nontrial dispositions are the
product of judicial rulings on pretrial motions but most—perhaps as high as
95 percent of civil cases—terminate through settlement20 to the point where

14. See generally Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income
Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531 (2016).
15. Miller, supra note 13, at 309.
16. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. 745, 762 (2010).
17. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 1
(“[O]ur federal courts actually tried fewer cases in 2002 than they did in 1962, despite a
fivefold increase in the number of civil filings . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
19. See id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 1, at 2 (citing different statistics, but reaching
the same general conclusion); John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent & Pamela Martin, A Profile of
Settlement, COURT REV., Fall–Winter 2006, at 34 (noting that less than 3 percent of civil
cases terminate in a trial verdict).
20. See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternate Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 818, 820 (1988). But see Barkai, Kent & Martin, supra note 19, at 35
(“Although ‘most cases settle,’ the percentage of cases that settle varies dramatically by the
type of case. . . . Contrary to the popular saying, nowhere near 90% or more of cases settle
(although torts come close).”).
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commentators describe a “judicial ‘settlement culture’” that “has become
pervasive in the federal courts.”21
Concurrently, there is a well-recognized reality that financial
considerations play a larger role in driving the legal profession than they
did when trials were more frequent. In fact, “the prevailing trend within the
legal community has been to associate the decline of professionalism in the
practice of law with the emergence of increasing commercialism, indicating
that law has become more a business than a profession.”22 This dynamic
plays itself out in two competing ways. On the one hand, lawyers who
charge their clients by the hour or project have an incentive to increase the
volume of billable work.23 On the other hand, lawyers compete for client
business based at least in part on the cost-effectiveness of their services.24
One of the ways lawyers sometimes reconcile the competing business
incentives is to drive up their adversaries’ litigation costs. Litigation costs
sometimes matter more in pricing settlements than the merits of the
underlying claims.25 Thus, the more pain lawyers can inflict, the better the
settlement deal they can ostensibly extract for their clients.26 The pain can
be in the form of the direct monetary costs of litigation, or it can be in the
form of business disruption, negative publicity, and risk (even small risk or
just the perception of small risk) of catastrophic liability. So, if the clients
have the resources and the will to endorse the pain-infliction philosophy,
lawyers achieve their objective of maximizing firm revenue while
simultaneously furthering their clients’ ostensible interests. As a result,
pretrial activities serve not to prepare the best case for a trial (which will
almost never happen) but instead serve to win a pretrial victory. Lawyers
exploit the pretrial tools not only for a victory through motion practice but
also for fee generation and settlement leverage. These latter ends, though

21. Freer, supra note 3, at 1509.
22. Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD.
L. REV. 217, 218 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956 (2000) (“[I]t is not at all evident that
practitioners, even highly ethical professionals, resist market incentives in any systematic
way.”).
24. See, e.g., Jay Fitzgerald, Corporate Clients Shift Priorities for Law Firms, BOS.
GLOBE (Mar. 2, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/03/02/white-shoe-lawfirms-scuffed-lower-cost-competition-and-growing-clout-corporate-clients/R7E5m4U4njUj
RzBtVFJGKL/story.html [https://perma.cc/P23C-LPL7].
25. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437, 437 (1988); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)
(“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases . . . .”); Nagareda, supra note 2, at 655 (“As [the probability of success on the
merits] approaches zero, the settlement zone for a given lawsuit will tend to be defined
primarily by the sum of the two sides’ litigation costs.”).
26. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary
Judgment 5–17 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 16-47, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845627 (describing costs of discovery and incentives for lawyers
to abuse it for purposes of exacting settlement leverage) [https://perma.cc/7SVD-EYPF].
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divorced from the stated objectives of the civil rules,27 are the incentives
that ultimately drive the abuses rampant in the pretrial industry.
The paradigm applies most logically to large-firm practice, where clients
pay by the hour or the project. Liberal discovery rules are “chiefly
responsible for the increased cost of legal services and for increased lawyer
wealth in the last part of the twentieth century.”28 In turn, “[l]arge firms vie
for reputations that lead to rankings such as most ‘fearsome’—a category
describing firms that ‘threaten to disrupt business as usual’ and ‘have the
ability to impact operations, rack up costly bills and potentially ruin
reputations.’”29 The paradigm also applies to lawyers who charge
contingent fees and who exploit pretrial devices to extract what Judge
Richard A. Posner, channeling Judge Henry Friendly, has characterized as
“blackmail settlements.”30 Lawyers who do not charge by the hour or by
the project certainly have a financial incentive to procure the highest
possible settlement with the least amount of work,31 but they also know that
their successful exploitation of the pretrial tools will bear directly on the
size of the settlements they can extract from their adversaries.
From an ethical standpoint, we should certainly find these incentives
troubling, as we would in any commercial industry that permits a service
provider to exploit her customer. But the legal profession is no ordinary
service provider; we are governed by ethical rules requiring us to expend
“reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the
client”32 and proscribe frivolous discovery conduct.33 Certainly most
lawyers honor their ethical obligations, but they do so in spite of, not in
keeping with, economic incentives. And the self-regulated nature of the
legal profession fails adequately to curb the behavior of lawyers unable to
resist the economic rewards of the unethical litigation conduct that can
infect the pretrial industry.34

27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”).
28. Freer, supra note 3, at 1514.
29. Andrew S. Pollis, Trying the Trial, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 55, 71 (2016) (quoting
Janet H. Cho, Jones Day Again Makes the “Fearsome Foursome,” the Top 4 Law Firms
Clients Most Dread Facing, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:29 AM), http://
www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2014/10/jones_day_again_makes_the_fearsome_fou
rsome_the_top_4_law_firms_clients_most_dread_facing.html [https://perma.cc/MS98-WK
KZ]).
30. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1674 (2011).
31. See Kessler et al., supra note 5, at 246 (noting that economically, “the contingent fee
lawyer has an incentive to settle a case very early in the litigation, even for an amount much
lower than the client would receive after trial, because the attorney bears all the litigation
expenses and can earn a high hourly fee by an early settlement”); see also Frank B. Cross,
The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.J. 523, 546
(1996).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
33. See id. r. 3.4(d).
34. See Pollis, supra note 29, at 107–08.

2102

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

II. LITIGATION TACTICS THAT
ANIMATE THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY
If the rise of the pretrial industry is contrary to the purpose of the civil
rules, it certainly finds ammunition—even implicit endorsement—in the
procedural tactics the rules themselves authorize. Chris Guthrie has
suggested that “the labyrinthine structure created by the rules virtually
guarantees” that litigants will “traverse pretrial and trial processes that are
almost invariably lengthy and costly.”35 Because lawyers inclined to use
the civil rules as weapons tend to exploit the various methods of pretrial
discovery (and methods of avoiding it), Part II.A addresses those discovery
tactics first. Part II.B then addresses the other major weapons that
constitute the arsenal of the pretrial industry: motions to dismiss (based on
now-heightened pleading standards) and motions for summary judgment.
A. Discovery Machinations as the Primary Currency
of the Pretrial Industry
Civil litigants ostensibly enjoy the privilege of discovering relevant
information36 through several devices, including interrogatories,37 requests
for admissions,38 document requests,39 and depositions.40 These devices
impose a multitiered matrix of burdens that are ripe for attorneys to exploit,
constituting “as much as 90 percent of litigation costs,”41 particularly in
high-stakes litigation or litigation in which at least one of the parties can
afford to pursue aggressive discovery as a way of wearing down its
opponent.
At the most superficial level, the party requesting written discovery (or
that party’s lawyer in contingent fee cases) bears the relatively manageable
cost of preparing the discovery requests, while the responding party bears
the sometimes “exorbitant” cost of responding.42 Depositions may require
equal time for the lawyers (for preparation and attendance), but they impose
35. Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1115, 1121 (2003).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
37. See id. 33.
38. See id. 36.
39. See id. 34.
40. See id. 30.
41. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (citing Memorandum from
Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair,
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000));
see also Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599,
1656–57 (2016) (“Financially, discovery is unmatched among the major sources of litigation
costs; it generates more legal fees and expenses than any other round of court proceedings.
According to various estimates, discovery can consume from fifty to as much as ninety
percent of total legal costs in some cases.”).
42. See Byron C. Keeling, A Prescription for Healing the Crisis in Professionalism:
Shifting the Burden of Enforcing Professional Standards of Conduct, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV.
31, 36–37 (1993). See generally Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the
Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
773 (2011).
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a far greater burden on the party being deposed or that party’s employer (for
time away from productivity and anxiety over the deposition process) than
on the party taking the deposition. Thus, at the superficial level, the party
requesting discovery has the capacity to create settlement leverage by
pursuing an aggressive discovery plan that will impose significant burdens
on its adversary.
But, as every litigator knows, there is much more to it. At the superficial
level, pretrial discovery proceeds without court involvement; there is no
need for a court order to initiate discovery.43 Moreover, the responding
party need not obtain a court order to resist written discovery; the rules
permit a party to stand on objections in lieu of providing substantive
information or producing documents responsive to written discovery
requests.44 And, of course, even a party who provides some substantive
information or documents can also withhold some, often leaving the
requesting party uncertain whether anything has been withheld (and, if so,
what it is).45 Thus, the incentives from both an attorney-fee and settlementleverage standpoint encourage lawyers to serve onerous discovery requests
on adversaries while holding back substantive responses to the extent
possible and litigating their positions if challenged.
Depositions work slightly differently but in ways that actually foment the
problem because they are easy to initiate and burdensome to oppose. A
party may not avoid a deposition simply by objecting, as she may do (at
least at first) in the case of written discovery requests. Instead, the wouldbe deponent must apply for a protective order ahead of the scheduled
deposition to avoid having to appear at the time and place designated by the
requestor.46 Thus, the mere serving of a one-paragraph deposition notice47
triggers a duty on the deponent either to attend or to seek a protective
order.48 Both options are far more burdensome than the requesting party’s
simple task of drafting and serving the notice.
The burdens are even greater if the deposition notice is directed to an
entity and designates specific topics on which the deponent must be
knowledgeable. In that event, the “named organization must then
43. The only predicate to initiating discovery is a prediscovery meeting with opposing
counsel, designed ostensibly to avoid discovery disputes. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1), (f);
see also id. 26(d)(2) (authorizing service of document requests twenty-one days after service
of the summons but deeming those requests served as of the date of the first Rule 26(f)
conference). To be sure, the rules authorize trial courts to “modify the extent of discovery”
at an initial pretrial conference. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). But the decision whether
even to schedule such a conference lies in the “sound discretion of the trial court.” Hayden v.
Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1960); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (stating
that the court “may” hold pretrial conference).
44. See, e.g., Badalamenti v. Dunham’s, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(listing various options in responding to document requests, including merely “objecting”).
45. The 2015 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C) now requires objections to “state
whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” It is too
early to assess the effect of that new requirement.
46. See, e.g., Kamps v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson L.L.P., 274 F.R.D. 115,
118 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1).
48. See id. 26(c).
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designate” a representative “to testify on its behalf.”49 The preparation of
such a representative for deposition can be “onerous.”50 And the failure to
prepare the witness adequately is “tantamount to a failure to appear” for the
deposition at all.51 The service of such a deposition notice therefore
automatically imposes significant costs on an adversary.
The burdens increase demonstrably when court intervention is required.
A party that wishes to challenge objections to written discovery may move
the court to compel it,52 just as a party seeking to avoid a deposition may
seek a protective order. But in both cases, the movant must certify to the
court that she has attempted to resolve the matter with opposing counsel
before bringing her motion,53 so the parties must go through the process of
detailing their respective positions and seeking to come to common ground.
While this “meet-and-confer” requirement has, theoretically at least, the
salutary benefit of eliminating or streamlining the disputes that require
judicial involvement,54 it can delay the ultimate resolution of the discovery
And the meet-and-confer requirement actually provides
dispute.55
additional incentives not to provide discovery in the first instance because
the responding party knows that its adversary cannot move to compel
discovery without having first attempted these premotion negotiations; the
withholding party can thus eventually retreat from unreasonable positions
with impunity, depriving the requesting party an opportunity to expose the
recalcitrance to the court.
Even when the process moves to the point of motion practice (a costly
exercise in itself),56 the very nature of discovery disputes renders them
vulnerable to poor judicial oversight.57 The fact-intensive nature of the
49. Id. 30(b)(6); see also James C. Winton, Corporate Representative Depositions
Revisited, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 938, 971 (2013) (“[T]he burden is on the corporation to gather
and present testimony on the subjects designated.”). Commentators have suggested that the
burden thus imposed on the entity can be draconian. See, e.g., Kent Sinclair & Roger P.
Fendrich, Discovering Corporate Knowledge and Contentions: Rethinking Rule 30(b)(6)
and Alternative Mechanisms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 651, 728–29 (1999).
50. Calzaturficio S.C.A.R.P.A. s.p.a. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D. Mass.
2001); Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 639 (D. Minn. 2000).
51. Black Horse Lane Assocs., L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 304 (3d Cir.
2000).
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
53. See id. 37(a)(1) (“The motion must include a certification that the movant has in
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.”); id. 26(c)(1) (same).
54. See, e.g., Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 197, 199 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The entire purpose
of the meet-and-confer rule is to force litigants to attempt to resolve, or a [sic] least narrow,
the disputed issues to prevent the unnecessary waste of time and effort on any given
motion.”).
55. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Big River Tel. Co., No. 08-2046-JWL, 2009 WL
1580307, at *1 (D. Kan. June 4, 2009) (questioning “whether the letter and the spirit of the
meet-and-confer rules were actually satisfied,” but resolving the discovery dispute “in the
interest of avoiding further delay”).
56. See, e.g., Curtis E.A. Karnow, Complexity in Litigation: A Differential Diagnosis,
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 52 (2015) (describing “formal discovery motion” as “cumbersome”
and “expensive”).
57. Indeed, “judicial reluctance to deal with discovery disputes is due in part to the
courts’ lack of the time and resources necessary to engage in the fact-intensive review and in
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disputes is often a serious impediment to timely judicial attention,
particularly because of other, ostensibly more pressing, obligations judges
must fulfill.58 So discovery disputes can linger, usually to the advantage of
one side. When judges do rule on discovery disputes, they often lack the
factual background to appreciate important nuances or the extent to which
either side may have engaged in questionable discovery tactics, and they
lack the time and inclination to dig into the finer points.59 The U.S.
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized as much, noting that “the success
of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest
side.”60
The 2015 amendments to the federal discovery rules61 were designed
“ostensibly to make litigation faster and cheaper”62 and thus to curtail some
of the currency of the pretrial industry.63 But there are no substantive
changes in the rules that will ensure significant change,64 so it is
questionable whether the changes will make progress toward that objective.
The most important change is to the language setting forth the standard
for discovery. Until 2015, information was discoverable if it was
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”65
Now, the standard expressed in the rule is that a party may request even
relevant discovery only if it is “proportional to the needs of the case,” with
several factors informing that proportionality test.66 It is too soon to assess
the practical effect of this language change,67 and some have suggested that

part to the courts’ unwillingness to make fact-dependent calls as to lawyers’ professional
behavior.” Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark Than
Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 132 n.88 (2011).
58. See id. at 126 (“[J]udges increasingly have little time to spare.”).
59. See id. at 127–28.
60. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
61. The Supreme Court submitted to Congress the 2015 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on April 29, 2015, see Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29,
2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z9LU-XC4V], and they went into effect on December 1, 2015, see Order Amending the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court
orders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9LU-XC4V].
62. Kenneth R. Berman, Reinventing Discovery Under the New Federal Rules,
LITIGATION, Spring 2016, at 22.
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“[D]iscussions of
ways to improve the administration of civil justice regularly include pleas to discourage
over-use, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase cost and result in delay.”).
64. See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. For an excellent summary of the
rule changes and a summary of the courts’ early application of them, see John M. Barkett,
The First 100 Days (or So) of the 2015 Civil Rules Amendments, 8 Digital Discovery & eEvid. (BNA), 8 DDEE (Apr. 14, 2016).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2007) (amended 2015).
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The relevant factors informing proportionality are “the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id.
67. See Barkett, supra note 64.
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it is no substantive change at all.68 But it stands to reason that the new
standard will continue to engender discovery battles,69 as will the very fact
of its newness.
Among other things, the factors that inform
proportionality70 are fact and case specific, so by definition the scope of
discovery will differ in every case and will require significant attorney time
to evaluate and advocate. Ultimately, permitting less discovery under the
new standard will lower the aggregate costs of discovery, but the result in
that scenario simply moves the settlement needle in favor of the party that
benefits from the procedural change, divorced from the ultimate merits.
The possibility of exploiting that shift (primarily of benefit to defendants)
or bearing the burden of it (primarily absorbed by plaintiffs) creates all the
more incentive for the parties to litigate over the scope of discovery.
Motion practice also raises the related question of cost shifting and
sanctions. The rules ostensibly require the losing party to pay attorney’s
fees associated with discovery motions,71 but that rule has several
exceptions, including if “circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.”72 Other sanctions are available for parties who violate discovery
orders.73 Yet sanctions can be as effective a tool for the wrongdoer as they
are for the wronged; discovery disputes often lead to “satellite litigation
over sanctions,” which “may work to the advantage of the guilty party.”74
And the available sanctions for lost or missing information—often
electronically stored information—have also fueled the pretrial industry;
“[t]he more that lawyers learned of these disputes and how they could alter
the settlement landscape or secure a case-dispositive sanction, the more
these disputes proliferated.”75
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the costs inherently associated with
discovery become exponentially more onerous when lawyers deliberately

68. See, e.g., Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 5088(RMB)(HBP), 2016 WL
616386, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (“[T]he 2015 Amendments constitute a reemphasis
on the importance of proportionality in discovery but not a substantive change in the law.”).
Even before the amendment, the rule provided that “[t]he frequency or extent
of . . . discovery . . . shall be limited by the court if it determines that . . . the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C) (2007) (amended 2015).
69. Berman, supra note 62, at 29 (“Lawyers . . . still will have boundary disputes,
though now over differently defined boundaries.”).
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (“If the motion is granted . . . the court must, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated
the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s
reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” (emphasis
added)); see also id. 37(a)(5)(B) (requiring the movant to pay costs and attorney’s fees if the
motion is denied); id. 37(b)(2)(C).
72. Id. 37(a)(5)(A)–(B).
73. Id. 37(b).
74. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery
Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness
of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 817.
75. Berman, supra note 62, at 25.
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exploit the rules to inflict pain on their adversaries.76 “Some have
analogized these lawyers to Sylvester Stallone’s movie character, the
bellicose John Rambo,”77 and the generally unsupervised nature of
discovery lends itself to this sort of exploitation.78 Indeed, “[d]iscovery
bullies aggressively pursue production of embarrassing or burdensome
information of questionable or no relevance to the underlying dispute,”
while “discovery evaders hide the ball; they make the process ‘a game to be
played by wordsmiths who will exploit every real and imagined ambiguity’
to avoid honest responses.”79 Although it is difficult to quantify the extent
of such abuse, “[t]he general sense of both practitioners and jurists is that
[it] happens, and it happens a lot.”80 And the costs associated with these
abusive tactics are more than simply financial.81 Some lawyers and parties
lack the fortitude and grit to litigate in this highly adversarial environment
and retreat to mispriced settlement, regardless of the merits of their claims
or defenses.82 Beyond the costs borne by the parties in individual litigation
matters, discovery abuse imposes even greater systemic costs on our justice
system, generating “considerable concern to . . . courts around the
nation.”83
B. Dispositive-Motion Practice as a Secondary Currency
of the Pretrial Industry
The second major component of the pretrial industry is dispositivemotion practice, consisting primarily of motions to dismiss (which typically
76. See generally Pollis, supra note 29, at 68–70 (discussing the problem of lawyers
who intentionally engage in abusive litigation tactics to bully their adversaries); G.M.
Filisko, You’re Out of Order!: Dealing with the Costs of Incivility in the Legal Profession,
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/youre_out_of_
order_dealing_with_the_costs_of_incivility_in_the_legal [https://perma.cc/75SP-Q4DF].
77. Pollis, supra note 29, at 68.
78. See id. at 70 (“Misbehavior in depositions has been a particular problem, perhaps
because they proceed in person and without judicial supervision.”).
79. Id. at 69 (quoting Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing
Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 229 (2006)).
80. Fitzpatrick & Norris, supra note 26, at 15.
81. See, e.g., Marrero, supra note 41, at 1656 (“When carried to extremes, [discovery]
costs are not only bountiful attorneys’ fees, but also the inordinate time, expense, abuse, and
frustration for all concerned.”).
82. Cf. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (describing “litigants not only as
calculating creatures, but also as feeling creatures. . . . [L]itigants base at least some
litigation decisions on ‘a desire to avoid the unpleasant psychological consequences’ of
regret arising from ‘a decision that turns out poorly.’” (quoting Richard P. Larrick,
Motivational Factors in Decision Theories: The Role of Self-Protection, 113 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 440, 440 (1993))); see also Marrero, supra note 41, at 1658 (“The typical aim of
excessive discovery tactics is to overwhelm an adversary with serial requests to disclose
documents of massive proportions or questionable value, or to meet burdensome production
schedules. In either event, the design of the demand, as one court observed in a commercial
dispute, is to drive the inconvenience and costs of litigation so high as to force the opponent
to abandon the fight.”).
83. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 (Del. 1994).
Despite the generalized concern, courts have failed to respond adequately to the pervasive
problem of litigation misconduct. See Pollis, supra note 29, at 107–08.
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attack the sufficiency of the pleaded allegations)84 and motions for
summary judgment (which challenge the need for a trial to resolve factual
disputes).85 Both types of motions, if successful, allow the movant to avoid
trial. Their prevalence emphasizes the reality that litigation is focused on
pretrial disposition. While these motions are ostensibly designed to curtail
litigation costs, they (summary judgment motions in particular) have
become a source of fee generation for lawyers and, relatedly, a settlement
incentive for the parties because of the cost of opposing them. These
incentives are separate from the underlying merits of the dispute.
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions
In 2007, the Supreme Court introduced heightened pleading with its
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.86 The scholarly literature is
replete with responses and critiques of Twombly and the Court’s 2009
follow-up decision Ashcroft v. Iqbal.87 Some, like Judge Patrick E.
Higginbotham, ascribe the rise of the heightened pleading standard to the
exorbitant costs of discovery: “[u]nable to control discovery, the regulatory
response has been to attempt to limit access to it” by dismissing cases
before discovery begins.88 The Twombly decision itself reflects this
intention.89
While litigators once assumed that dismissal was generally available only
if the pleaded factual allegations were either insufficient to support a claim
or not actionable at law,90 that assumption has now faded. Today, the
available inferences to be drawn from the factual allegations and their
plausibility are subject to judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage.91 The very
subjectivity of these criteria92 affords lawyers every incentive to exploit
them, especially given the substantial possibility that “a tie goes to the
defendant.”93 And, of course, the cost of drafting and opposing these
motions aids in fee generation (although, admittedly, a successful motion
would deprive the winning lawyer of the fees associated with the discovery
84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
85. See id. 56.
86. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
87. 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV.
435, 450 n.95 (2014) (discussing the body of literature on Twombly and Iqbal).
88. Higginbotham, supra note 16, at 750–51.
89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to
antitrust discovery can be expensive.” (citation omitted)).
90. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient
facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”).
91. See Pollis, supra note 87, at 451, 460.
92. Indeed, “Iqbal has been resoundingly criticized for, among other things, failing to
articulate a cohesive measure by which lower courts can differentiate between
unsubstantiated conclusory allegations (apparently implausible under Iqbal) and factually
detailed assertions sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss (apparently plausible).” Id. at
451.
93. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 626 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
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that dismissal would avoid). While commentators may debate the wisdom
or significance of these decisions, “there seems to be no doubt that the cases
have increased the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.”94 Thus,
whether or not warranted or successful, the battle over pleading sufficiency
has become a major tool of the pretrial industry.
2. Summary Judgment Motions
In 2010, Judge Higginbotham observed that motions for summary
judgment have “displaced the trial as the destination point for litigation.”95
Indeed, the summary judgment motion has become a staple of litigation
since the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy of decisions clarifying the summary
judgment standards96 and tacitly encouraging trial judges to employ pretrial
disposition more regularly.97 Empirical evidence suggests that trial judges
have done exactly that.98 And, of course, summary judgment arguments
depend heavily on evidentiary materials developed through discovery,99 so
those two components of the pretrial industry exacerbate each other.
Properly granted summary judgment motions obviously achieve
efficiency goals because they spare all parties the cost of trial while
disposing of cases on their merits. But the added efficiency is offset by
improper grants of summary judgment (particularly when reversed on
appeal, leading to additional trial court proceedings)100 and by summary
judgment denials, proper or improper, that provide no added value except to
the attorneys who bill their time for working on them.101 They can easily
become, as one commentator has noted, “a net drain on society.”102
94. Freer, supra note 3, at 1515–16.
95. Higginbotham, supra note 16, at 746.
96. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
97. “[T]he 1986 Supreme Court trilogy is striking because of the strong pro-summary
judgment language found throughout the Court’s three opinions.” Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and
Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 1028 (2003).
98. Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 193
(“Empirical evidence suggests that the standard for summary judgment may have become
more relaxed over time, in the sense that courts are more willing to grant motions for
summary judgment today than in years past.”).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (listing available summary judgment evidence, which
includes “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, . . . admissions, [and]
interrogatory answers”); see also Langbein, supra note 9, at 570 (summary judgment
motions are “routinely based on discovery product”).
100. More than 20 percent of summary judgments are reversed on appeal in federal
courts, and the figures are even higher in the Federal Circuit. See Ted L. Field, “Judicial
Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 765
(2012).
101. I do not mean to ignore the value of clarity that a trial court can offer in denying
summary judgment, either by narrowing the factual disputes that will define the trial or in
resolving the parties’ disagreements over the applicable law. But “the summary judgment
usually saves time only when it is granted and terminates a case or is sufficiently partially
granted to streamline trial of a case.” Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme
Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
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III. A TWO-PRONGED SOLUTION
FOR DIFFUSING THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY
Some scholars have called for the restoration of the civil trial as an
antidote to the injustices of the pretrial industry103 or as a prescription to
reallocate to civil juries their constitutional power to resolve factual
disputes.104 It is unlikely that the judicial system will heed these calls,
given the perceived costs of trial and the institutional inertia that has taken
root over the decades. Indeed, the political antipathy toward the civil
justice system105 has prompted reforms that have made trial less likely, not
more,106 and there is no reason to believe that the trend will reverse course.
Nevertheless, there are reforms that would curtail some of the costs of the
pretrial industry and restore emphasis on the merits of a case as the primary
basis for evaluating settlement. I propose two such reforms here:
(1) holding summary jury trials early in the litigation—before motion
practice and discovery—to offer the parties a neutral evaluation of the
merits by community members who would approximate the composition of
a jury in a real trial, with consequences for parties who reject the results of
the summary trial and then do worse at an actual trial and (2) routine
appointment of special discovery masters to ensure that the costs of abusive
discovery, financial and otherwise, do not play an outsized role in
influencing outcomes.
A. Routinely Holding Summary Jury Trials
“The summary jury trial is a nonbinding . . . process presided over by a
district or magistrate judge and designed to promote settlement in trialready cases.”107 Its purpose is to “provide[] litigants and their counsel with
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 172 (1988). As Arthur Miller has noted, “the expense and
frequency of litigating summary judgment motions and the frequency of appeals from
decisions granting them have undermined arguments espousing summary judgment as
beneficial to judicial efficiency.” Pollis, supra note 87, at 490 (citing Miller, supra note 13,
at 312 n.98).
102. D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 876 (2006).
103. See, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 16, at 762. See generally Stephen B. Burbank &
Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011).
104. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 103, at 402 (contending that “diminution of jury
trials . . . is a tragedy”); Pollis, supra note 87, at 490 (“We must preserve the inferencedrawing function that the Seventh Amendment clearly bestows on individual citizens who
participate, through jury service, in the political process.”).
105. See generally Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002); Miller, supra note 13, at 302–03 (“Political
candidates and office holders score cheap points with attacks on our justice system, cloaking
themselves in the deceptive mantle of ‘tort reform.’”).
106. Professor Miller characterizes the impediments to trial as deliberately imposed
“early-termination developments” designed “to suit the economic or political agendas of
powerful interest groups at the expense of the original philosophical objectives of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Miller, supra note 13, at 310.
107. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 81 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL LITIGATION
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an advisory verdict after an abbreviated hearing in which counsel present
summary evidence to a jury.”108 It functions as a “sort of mock jury” in
which “jurors are drawn from the actual jury pool and seated for an
abbreviated trial.”109 “Witnesses are generally not called,” but instead
lawyers summarize the anticipated evidence as they attempt to persuade the
mock jurors to reach an advisory verdict in their client’s favor.110 The
whole process generally takes a day or less.111
The concept of summary jury trials has been around for over thirty
years.112 But only about 25 percent of courts authorize it,113 and the
procedure “has largely disappeared, in part because it was unavailable until
too late in the litigation process.”114 Since summary jury trials are “thought
to be most useful after discovery is complete,”115 there was no particular
advantage in holding a summary jury trial rather than proceeding
immediately to a full-blown trial.
But there is no reason that summary jury trials need to occur so late in the
litigation process, after the pretrial industry has done its damage. To the
contrary, in cases that involve factual disputes as to either liability or
damages,116 permitting or requiring litigants to proceed to a summary jury
trial before discovery begins would afford meaningful feedback to the
parties about the relative strengths and weaknesses of their positions at an
early stage of litigation.117 In effect, the parties could factor the results of
the summary jury trial into their calculus of whether to proceed to discovery
or whether to settle immediately. And, having not yet incurred the bulk of
the litigation expenses, the parties may have an easier time reaching an
agreement.118
MANAGEMENT MANUAL], http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CivLit2D.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C5W6-GK99]. The Civil Litigation Management Manual “is for the guidance of
judges. It is not intended to be relied upon as authority, and it creates no rights or duties.”
Id. at i.
108. Id. at 81.
109. Bert I. Huang, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1372 (2013).
110. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 81.
111. Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender: Summary Jury Trial as a Means
to Overcome Iqbal’s Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation and
Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1149, 1186 (2010).
112. See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
113. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 82.
114. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1740 (2012); see also CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 82
(“[F]ew cases are referred to this process.”).
115. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 81.
116. Summary jury trials would not be particularly useful in cases that involve no
contested issues or that turn only on issues of law.
117. See Welsh, supra note 111, at 1185–88.
118. See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2013) (“Late settlements appear to be a more
common mistake than premature settlements because a significant percentage of cases settle
after most or all discovery has been completed, on the eve of trial, or on the courthouse
steps.”). But see id. at 573 (“Settlements consummated before the litigants possess adequate
information, whether of factual or a legal nature, may be premature.”).
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Summary jury trials, at least as they are traditionally set up, will not
alone accomplish the goal of discouraging the pretrial industry, even if they
occur earlier in the process. There are generally no consequences of
disregarding the summary jury’s verdict and proceeding to trial, other than
the cost of the trial itself and the obvious risk that the trial result will be the
same.119 An additional incentive is warranted to require the parties to make
a rational choice about whether to proceed. For that reason, a party that is
unwilling to honor the summary jury’s verdict, and who instead forces her
adversary to proceed to discovery, dispositive motions, and trial, must bear
additional risk. I propose the risk of fee shifting: in the event the ultimate
adjudicated result for the recalcitrant party is no better than the summary
jury’s verdict, the trial court should have the discretion to require that party
to bear its adversary’s attorney’s fees. Imposing that risk will force the
parties to think very carefully about the wisdom of proceeding.120
In the context of summary jury trials, a fee-shifting proposal makes sense
because the party potentially charged with its adversary’s fees is responsible
for the decision to begin the expensive discovery, dispositive motion, and
trial process. A rational decision maker would accept the summary jury’s
verdict and cut off the pretrial industry at the legs unless she believes either
that the summary jury’s verdict was grossly aberrant or that proceeding to
discovery would uncover additional evidence that would strengthen her
case on summary judgment or at trial.
Of course, the proposal has its imperfections. The most obvious is
information asymmetry; having not yet undertaken any discovery, the
parties would not have access to the full panoply of evidence to exploit at
the summary jury trial that they would hope to have by the time of a real
trial, thus reducing the accuracy of the advisory verdict and the value the
parties would place on it. The asymmetry arises because the problem
would perhaps afflict plaintiffs more than defendants,121 and it would be
particularly acute in cases where a party has concealed evidence or where
as-yet-unprocured expert testimony is crucial to the outcome. But plaintiffs
must have a good-faith factual basis for filing a lawsuit,122 and there is no
119. See CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 81 (“If no
settlement is reached, the case returns to the trial track.”).
120. My proposal mirrors a similar proposal I have made in another context: in claims
that turn on an actor’s state of mind, I have proposed that courts should restore to juries the
power to resolve competing inferences, but in the event a jury reaches a defense verdict, it
should also evaluate the strength of the plaintiff’s evidence. See Pollis, supra note 87, at
484–85. If the evidence is extremely weak, the court should have the discretion to require
the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees, taking into account a number of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. See id. at 485–86. This proposal is aimed at
reducing the number of state-of-mind cases dismissed at the pleading or summary judgment
stage, while requiring plaintiffs to think carefully about whether their evidence is strong
enough to run the risk of an adverse fee award.
121. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 159
(2011) (describing “large information asymmetries” in certain kinds of cases, “such as civil
rights, constitutional, and employment discrimination cases,” that can make it difficult for
plaintiffs to plead adequately under heightened-pleading standards).
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that counsel’s signature on a complaint
constitutes representation that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
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policy justification for shielding them from the scrutiny of a summary jury
if their lawyers have met their ethical obligations before filing.123 In some
ways, then, the summary jury trial functions as another vehicle for
scrutinizing the adequacy of the pleaded allegations,124 but it does so
through the lens of individuals who approximate actual jurors rather than
the “members of an ‘elite class’” of judges (as motion practice does).125 If
the lack of information at the summary jury trial stage is the basis for a
favorable defense verdict, then it is not unfair to allocate to the plaintiff the
risk that she will not uncover sufficient information in discovery to succeed
at later stages. In short, if the party with less access to relevant information
makes the calculated decision to proceed with discovery instead of settling
for the amount reflected in the summary jury trial result, that party would
bear the risk that the information obtained through discovery will not
support that choice. Moreover, the parties always have the option of
revisiting settlement after discovery but before summary judgment or trial,
thus giving them an opportunity to avoid fee shifting if discovery does not
bear fruit.
A second imperfection is that parties would have an incentive to misstate
the facts at the summary jury trial to increase the likelihood of a favorable
result, thus distorting the settlement calculus and preventing a reasoned
assessment of the fee-shifting risk. Judicial involvement would be useful
here, both at the front end (in resolving disputes over the content of the
presentations) and the back (in determining whether to award fees). A party
who misrepresents the facts at the summary jury trial obviously should not
be able to exploit the skewed result in later seeking a fee award. And, to the
extent the misrepresentation is found to have been both deliberate and
material, it could warrant the imposition of sanctions.126
It is also true that summary jury trials would require the time and
resources of both the parties and the presiding judge, so it has the potential
to be costly. The extent of those resources will obviously depend on a
number of factors, such as the extent to which the court will entertain
objections to legitimacy of the factual representations in the parties’
presentations or will deliver substantive jury instructions on the applicable
substantive law. The absence of the judge’s involvement on these kinds of
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery”).
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
shall not bring . . . a proceeding, or assert . . . an issue therein, unless there is a basis
in . . . fact for doing so that is not frivolous”); see also id. r. 3.3(a)(1) (stating that a lawyer
shall not knowingly “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal”).
124. See Welsh, supra note 111, at 1186 (proposing “the use of summary jury trial to aid
courts as they determine whether to allow plaintiffs to proceed into discovery”).
125. See Pollis, supra note 87, at 473 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
126. One colleague at the colloquium objected to the fee-shifting proposal because of the
disproportionate risk it would create for the party, typically the plaintiff, with less
prediscovery access to information. That concern is well taken. Vesting the court with the
discretion to impose sanctions for misrepresentations made during the summary jury trial is
one way to mitigate it.
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matters would likely distort the result, thus reducing the utility of the
verdict as a settlement tool. Although the court’s involvement would
obviously be burdensome, there are ways of mitigating that burden, such as
requiring the parties to work to reach agreement and shifting fees to any
party who deviates from a fair representation of the facts or the law. Even
if the legal system must absorb these costs, the corollary benefit from the
earlier settlement would go a long way toward mitigating them and perhaps
result in a net savings. Judge Posner has called for “‘hesitation’ in the use
of summary jury trials” because they “enlarge jury service,”127 but that
concern also seems misguided if the process ultimately ends up reducing
the need for judicial resources down the road.
At bottom, requiring parties to engage in a summary jury trial at the
outset of litigation would give them an opportunity to hear an objective
reaction to their claims and defenses before the pretrial industry takes its
toll. It would empower them to make better-informed decisions about
proceeding with the lawsuit at a point in time when they have not yet borne
the exorbitant costs of litigation. And it would also afford “a marginalized
plaintiff with the opportunity to tell her story to a judge, jury and decisionmakers for the defendant,” thus “approximat[ing] the experience of
procedural justice provided by a ‘day in court.’”128
B. Greater Reliance on Special Discovery Masters
The second proposal I offer to curtail the costs of the pretrial industry is
the more frequent appointment of special discovery masters. We need a
judicial system that is more responsive to the actual experiences of civil
litigation. It is thus imperative that we elevate the role of discovery
supervision to a position commensurate with the burdens discovery
imposes.
The need for greater supervision over discovery was one of the primary
drivers of the 2015 amendments to the civil rules. The position papers
submitted in advance of the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation129 (often
referenced as the “Duke Conference”) lamented that judges were not active
enough in supervising discovery.130 Seventy-two percent of attorneys
127. See Glover, supra note 114, at 1740 n.106 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 386 (1986)).
128. See Welsh, supra note 111, at 1187.
129. See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2254-PL5W].
130. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2010) [hereinafter
ADVISORY COMM. REPORT], www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf (“One area of
consensus in the various surveys, however, was that district or magistrate judges must be
considerably more involved in managing each case from the outset, to tailor the motions
practice and shape the discovery to the reasonable needs of that case.”)
[https://perma.cc/C5X5-48VC]; AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN
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surveyed by the American Bar Association Section of Litigation “believe
that early intervention helps to limit discovery,” but 60 percent also
“believe that judges do not enforce [the existing] mechanisms to limit
discovery.”131 This concern is not new.132
Unfortunately, the amendments did very little to fix that problem. The
drafters articulated the conflict in the competing objectives they sought to
balance:
The challenge is to achieve [adequate judicial supervision] on a
consistent, institutional basis without interfering with the independence
and creativity of each judge and district responding to the specific mix of
cases and docket conditions, and without interfering with the effective
handling of many cases under existing rules and practices.133

In the end, they opted for anemic precatory language that ultimately leaves
the supervision of discovery to the discretion of individual judges, just as it
always has been, and practitioners have bemoaned this missed
opportunity.134
Left to their own devices, judges are not likely to become more active in
the resolution of discovery disputes under the new rules. Indeed, “[t]here
are very few parts of the job that judges dislike more.”135 Judges face many
competing demands on their dockets—criminal cases, dispositive motions,
requests for accelerated injunctive relief, settlement conferences, and (when
it occurs) trial—so they must allocate their time and resources, and
discovery disputes tend to fall to the bottom of the list.136 And, while

COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/final_report_on_the_joint_project_of_the_actl_task_force_on_discovery_and_t
he_iaals_1.pdf (“Judges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in
designing the scope of discovery and the direction and timing of the case all the way to trial.
Where abuses occur, judges are perceived not to enforce the rules effectively.”)
[https://perma.cc/BC38-FUJK].
131. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE:
DETAILED REPORT 3 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/aba_section_of_
litigation_survey_on_civil_practice_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/H68Q-3MCH].
132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment
(“[I]nvolvement of the court in managing discovery is an important method of controlling
problems of inappropriately broad discovery. Increasing the availability of judicial officers
to resolve discovery disputes and increasing court management of discovery were both
strongly endorsed by the attorneys surveyed by the Federal Judicial Center.”).
133. ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 130, at 4.
134. See, e.g., Ellen Ross Belfer, Judicial Oversight of Discovery in the Amended Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, LEON COSGROVE (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.leoncosgrove.com/
blog/judicial-oversight-discovery-amended-federal-rules-civil-procedure/#sthash.byL3Ps
vZ.dpuf (The “amendments do nothing to require hold-out judges to become involved earlier
or more consistently. . . . [T]here is no reason to expect that the desired judicial behavior
will come about until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are amended to require it.”)
[https://perma.cc/W9A7-GRZL].
135. Steven Weiss, Seven Tips on How to Behave in Court, LITIGATION, Spring 2016, at
4–5.
136. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
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judges often delegate the discovery-management task to magistrates,137
magistrates cannot dedicate themselves sufficiently to discovery matters
given the range of their responsibilities and the increased frequency with
which judges refer other types of case-management responsibilities to
them.138
Nevertheless, discovery disputes have an outsized impact on the cost of
civil litigation and demand more compulsory supervision from the courts.
To that end, courts should make more frequent use of their authority to
appoint special masters to supervise discovery, as the civil rules
authorize.139 The use of special masters is growing, but “the number of
reported appointments is still relatively small.”140 Courts should embrace
their authority to appoint special masters on a more regular basis to
supervise discovery disputes. Special masters dedicated to that task, free of
the other responsibilities that judges and magistrates must fulfill, will be in
a better position to achieve the goal of ensuring that parties do not abuse the
discovery process.
Moreover, the cost of routinely appointing special masters should not be
an impediment. As a threshold matter, there will be no need for a special
master’s time if the parties settle their dispute after the summary jury trial.
In any event, courts are already authorized to allocate the special master’s
payment “among the parties after considering the nature and amount of the
controversy, the parties’ means, and the extent to which any party is more
responsible than other parties for the reference to a master.”141 In ordinary
circumstances, parties whose discovery conduct necessitates the services of
the special master should pay her fees, an allocation the discovery rules
already contemplate.142 Allocating the payment according to these
equitable factors will deter parties from discovery abuse.
One colloquium colleague suggested that special masters may be more
appropriate for some cases (presumably complex or high-stakes cases in
which discovery disputes tend to arise more frequently and contentiously)
than for others. The comment is reasonable, but practitioners will also
confirm that discovery can get unnecessarily contentious even in the most
unlikely of cases. So we should not establish fixed criteria to guide judicial
discretion in deciding to appoint a special master. We should instead rely
on its utility in streamlining discovery disputes, as well as the influence that
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012); Landyn Wm. Rookard, Note, A Referee
Without a Whistle: Magistrate Judges and Discovery Sanctions in the Seventh Circuit, 91
IND. L.J. 569, 571 (2016).
138. See Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than Indispensable”: The
Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter
Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845, 925–47 (2016) (analyzing statistical data from 1990 to 2014 on
the expansion of the magistrate’s role in federal court); see also Blanchard, supra note 57, at
127 (noting that magistrate judges “are equally busy”).
139. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
140. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery:
The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 369 (2008).
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3).
142. See supra note 71.
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potentially paying for the special master’s services will have on the parties’
willingness to engage in improper discovery conduct.
In short, relying more routinely on special masters to supervise discovery
will bring much-needed control to the cost-intensive discovery process that
fuels the pretrial industry. The cost of discovery will decrease, at least to
the extent abusive behavior drives it, or it will be borne by the party who
deserves to bear it.
CONCLUSION
Like most endemic problems, the pretrial industry is rooted in human
nature. We behave in ways that are most likely to reward us. As the civil
trial disappeared, the pretrial industry evolved because it enriches lawyers
and often extracts favorable settlements. But the costs to our system are
enormous, and the settlements are often mispriced.
Judges are also human. No matter how much we cajole them or
promulgate aspirational rules, they will never have the time or adequate
incentives to curtail the pretrial industry. Indeed, nondiscretionary systemic
change is the only way out of the money pit that the legal profession has
dug for itself. By requiring civil litigants to participate in summary jury
trials and imposing fee shifting on those who ignore the results, we can
offer litigants a day in court that will arm them with important information
about the strengths and weaknesses of their case, which, coupled with risk
of proceeding to trial, should foster more frequent settlement. And by
regularly appointing special discovery masters, we can provide supervision
over the discovery process that its enormous influence on the cost of
litigation warrants.
In sum, we can put an end to the pretrial industry, or at least reduce its
magnitude. The question remains whether we truly have the determination
to do it.

